# Made in China 2025

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> Updated: 2026-07-14
> Categories: AI Policy & Regulation, Chinese AI
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**Made in China 2025** (Chinese: 中国制造2025; pinyin: Zhongguo Zhizao 2025), commonly abbreviated MIC2025 or MIC 2025, is a ten-year industrial policy that China's State Council issued in May 2015 to shift the country's manufacturing base away from low-cost, labor-intensive assembly and toward high-value, technology-intensive production.[1][2] The plan named ten priority sectors, from semiconductors and [robotics](/wiki/robotics) to biopharmaceuticals, and paired them with numerical self-sufficiency targets, state guidance funds, and preferential financing.[1][3] It became a flashpoint in US-China trade relations after 2018, and Chinese officials subsequently stopped naming the plan in public communications even as the underlying buildout continued. A decade later, that buildout underpins much of China's position in electric vehicles, drones, and batteries, and increasingly the [humanoid robot](/wiki/humanoid_robot) supply chain behind today's [embodied AI](/wiki/embodied_ai) push.[9][14]

In brief: Made in China 2025 is Beijing's plan to stop merely assembling other countries' technology and start designing and building the advanced components itself, in the ten sectors the government judged most strategically important. It set specific percentage targets for how much of each sector's supply chain should be Chinese-made, backed those targets with hundreds of billions of dollars in state funds, and drew a US tariff response over allegations of forced technology transfer and unfair subsidy. Officials in Beijing rarely say the plan's name anymore, but its sectors, its funding model, and its successor programs still shape Chinese industrial policy in 2026.

## Origins and goals

China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) drafted the plan over roughly two and a half years, drawing on input from around 150 experts convened through the China Academy of Engineering.[2] Premier Li Keqiang previewed the concept in his Government Work Report of March 5, 2015, and the State Council formally issued the full plan, State Council Document No. 28 of 2015 (Guofa [2015] No. 28), on May 8, 2015, releasing it publicly on May 19, 2015.[1]

The plan drew explicit inspiration from Germany's Industrie 4.0 initiative, first discussed by German industry and academic groups around 2011 and formally adopted as government policy in 2013.[2] Where Industrie 4.0 describes the digitalization of an already advanced manufacturing base, MIC2025 set out to compress several stages of industrial development into one generation, aiming for advanced, networked manufacturing capability by 2025.[2]

The stated ambition was to shift China's reputation from "Made in China" to "Created in China," from speed to quality, and from anonymous manufacturing to recognized Chinese brands.[1] The plan set a three-stage roadmap running to 2049, the centenary of the People's Republic: join the first tier of global manufacturing powers by 2025, reach the middle of that tier by 2035, and become a leading manufacturing power by 2049.[1][3] MIC2025 covers only the first of those milestones; a later, companion "China Standards 2035" initiative, aimed at shaping international technical standards in the same sectors, has been described by analysts as extending the project rather than replacing it.[23]

## The ten priority sectors

The plan identified ten sectors for concentrated state support, chosen for their combination of strategic importance, high value-added content, and reliance on imported technology at the time.[2][6]

| # | Sector (official rendering) | Scope | Status a decade later, per named assessments |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | New-generation information technology | Integrated circuits and semiconductor manufacturing, 5G and mobile communications, core industrial software, high-end servers | Domestic chip market share rose from about 19 percent (2015) to about 33 percent (2023), short of an interim 50 percent goal, and continued to lag the global frontier in advanced logic, according to the USCC[6] and Rhodium Group[7] |
| 2 | High-end CNC machine tools and robotics | Industrial robots, computer-numerically-controlled machine tools, and core robot components such as reducers and servo motors | Domestic robot makers reportedly overtook foreign brands in China sales for the first time in 2024, per Rhodium Group[7], though CNC machine tools reached only about 33 percent domestic share against an 80 percent target, per the USCC[6] |
| 3 | Aerospace and aviation equipment | Commercial aircraft, aero engines, airborne systems | The domestically built C919 airliner delivered 13 aircraft in 2024, about 7 percent of domestic demand against a 10 percent target, per the USCC[6] |
| 4 | Maritime engineering equipment and high-tech ships | LNG and LPG carriers, offshore platforms, specialized vessels | China delivered an estimated 53 percent of world ship tonnage in 2024 and hosted five of the world's ten largest shipbuilders, per the USCC[6] |
| 5 | Advanced rail transit equipment | High-speed trains, signaling systems | State-owned CRRC operates high-speed lines at up to 350 km/h, but rail-equipment export share reached only about 16 percent against a 40 percent goal, per the USCC[6] |
| 6 | Energy-saving and new-energy vehicles | Battery-electric, hybrid, and hydrogen fuel-cell vehicles and their supply chains | Chinese brands held roughly 91 percent of the domestic new-energy-vehicle market by 2024 and about 60 percent of global electric-vehicle sales, per the USCC[6] and the IEA[15] |
| 7 | Electrical and power equipment | Power generation, transmission, and renewable-energy equipment | Renewable-energy manufacturing targets were largely met or exceeded ahead of schedule, per the USCC[6] |
| 8 | Agricultural machinery and equipment | Tractors, harvesters, precision-agriculture equipment | Widely described as the clearest miss; foreign brands such as John Deere retained a strong position in China despite subsidies for domestic alternatives, per the USCC[6] |
| 9 | New materials | Advanced alloys, composites, rare-earth-based materials, graphene | Mixed. Carbon-fiber self-sufficiency rose from about 18 percent (2015) to about 47 percent (2021), per Rhodium Group[7] |
| 10 | Biopharmaceuticals and high-performance medical devices | Innovative drugs, diagnostic and imaging equipment | Drug-approval targets were largely met (26 Class 1 innovative drugs approved in 2022 alone), but medical-imaging-device localization reached only about 26 percent against a 70 percent goal, per the USCC[6] |

## Targets and state support

### Domestic content targets

The main May 2015 document set broad strategic goals rather than a detailed scorecard. The specific numbers most often cited come from a companion series of "Green Papers" and a technology roadmap that MIC2025's advisory committee, made up of engineers and industry associations, published in the months that followed.[1][3] That roadmap set the best-known target: raise the domestic-content share of "core components and key basic materials" to 40 percent by 2020 and 70 percent by 2025.[1][3]

According to a detailed analysis by the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), the roadmap broke the ambition down further by sub-sector, aiming for Chinese suppliers to reach roughly 90 percent of new-energy-vehicle powertrain content and 80 percent of connected-vehicle IT content by 2025, alongside a broader schedule of 2025-to-2030 domestic-demand-share goals: 90 percent or more for agricultural machinery and basic materials; 80 percent for advanced ships, electric-vehicle batteries, medical-device components, mobile devices, and high-performance computers; and 70 percent for industrial robots and advanced medical devices.[3]

These numbers, and the "Made in China 2025" name attached to them, drew sustained criticism from trading partners as a form of import substitution inconsistent with China's World Trade Organization commitments.[4] Partly in response, Chinese officials increasingly described the targets as aspirational guidance for industry rather than binding, WTO-relevant policy, a framing that became more pronounced after 2018.[4]

### Guidance funds and subsidies

MIC2025 was backed by a layered system of state guidance funds, which take equity stakes in favored companies rather than issuing simple grants, alongside tax incentives, preferential loans, and procurement rules favoring domestic suppliers.[4][7] Outside estimates of the aggregate value of this support run into the hundreds of billions of dollars, though the exact total is not publicly disclosed and depends heavily on which programs are counted.[4] Rhodium Group's review found that tax benefits tied to innovation grew at roughly 28.8 percent a year between 2018 and 2022, and that the number of firms receiving these tax breaks roughly quadrupled between 2015 and 2023.[7]

| Fund | Established | Size | Focus |
|---|---|---|---|
| National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund, Phase I ("Big Fund I") | 2014 | RMB 138.7 billion (about $21.8 billion) | Semiconductor manufacturing[18] |
| Big Fund II | 2019 | RMB 204 billion (about $29.1 billion) | Semiconductor manufacturing[18] |
| Big Fund III | 2024 | RMB 344 billion (about $47.5 billion) | Semiconductor equipment and materials[18] |
| National Manufacturing Transformation and Upgrading Fund | 2019 | RMB 147.2 billion (about $21.0 billion) | Cross-sector upgrades in new materials, IT, and power equipment[19] |
| National AI Industry Investment Fund | 2025 | $8.2 billion | Artificial intelligence industry, including robotics[12] |
| Shanghai municipal humanoid-robotics fund | 2024 | $1.4 billion | Local humanoid-robotics buildout[11] |

## International response: Section 301 and beyond

The United States Trade Representative opened a Section 301 investigation into China's technology-transfer and intellectual-property practices in August 2017. Its report, issued in March 2018, found China's practices "unreasonable" and burdensome to US commerce, citing MIC2025's targeted sectors as evidence that state subsidy and forced technology transfer, not open competition, were driving China's gains in advanced manufacturing.[4] The resulting tariffs arrived in waves: a 25 percent tariff on about $50 billion of Chinese goods in July and August 2018, then a 10 percent tariff on about $200 billion more in September 2018, raised to 25 percent in May 2019.[4] The first tranche specifically targeted machinery, aerospace components, robotics, and other MIC2025-linked categories.[4] Section 301 tariffs remained a live policy tool years later: in December 2025, the USTR opened a new Section 301 action targeting China's semiconductor-sector practices specifically, with tariffs beginning near zero and scheduled to rise after eighteen months.[29]

The response extended beyond the United States. Germany, France, and Australia, along with the European Union more broadly, tightened screening of inbound Chinese investment during this period; Germany, historically China's largest destination for investment in Europe, pushed for an EU-wide investment-review mechanism.[4] More recently, the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China assessed that the plan exceeded its targets in autos but missed them in aerospace and high-end robotics, and warned that the drive to hit MIC2025-style targets had contributed to industrial overcapacity: in a 2024 Chamber survey, 36 percent of member companies already saw overcapacity in their sector and another 10 percent expected it soon, with the sharpest concerns in automotive (62 percent), pharmaceuticals (56 percent), and industrial machinery (55 percent).[8] The same Chamber assessment noted that China's manufacturing value-added growth rate, a headline MIC2025 metric, reached only 6.1 percent in 2024, down from about 7 percent in 2015 and well short of an 11 percent target.[8]

## From explicit policy to quiet continuity

Criticism of MIC2025 sharpened through 2018, including public remarks from then US Vice President Mike Pence that fall.[5] Within weeks of the first Trump-administration tariffs in June 2018, Chinese state media and government documents began dropping explicit references to "Made in China 2025."[5] The shift became unmistakable in March 2019, when Premier Li Keqiang's annual Government Work Report to the National People's Congress omitted any mention of the plan for the first time since its 2015 introduction.[5]

The substance did not disappear. Chinese industrial policy increasingly folded MIC2025's sectors and methods into a broader framing built around technological self-reliance, a concept that gained renewed prominence beginning around 2018 and was further consolidated through Communist Party planning sessions in 2025, feeding into the 15th Five-Year Plan covering 2026 to 2030.[27] Analysts describe the parallel "China Standards 2035" initiative, which aims to shape the international technical standards governing many of the same sectors, as building on MIC2025 rather than superseding it.[23]

## A decade of results

Independent assessments published around MIC2025's ten-year mark converge on a mixed picture. The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission's November 2025 review found that China-based firms accounted for nearly a quarter of global export growth in the ten MIC2025 sectors between 2015 and 2023, while noting that formal numeric targets were met in some sectors (new-energy vehicles, shipbuilding, space launch and satellite navigation) and missed in others (aviation, agricultural machinery, high-end CNC tools, and, by the strictest reading, semiconductors).[6] Rhodium Group's independent review reached a similar conclusion, describing "substantial progress in building large industrial sectors" alongside "continuing dependencies, particularly in high-tech components" such as extreme-ultraviolet lithography equipment, where Dutch firm ASML remains the sole global supplier of the most advanced machines.[7] The European Union Chamber of Commerce in China's assessment emphasized the downside of that same progress: overcapacity in state-favored sectors including solar panels, electric-vehicle batteries, and legacy-node chips, which it linked to depressed prices, thinner margins, and rising trade friction with China's trading partners.[8]

Semiconductors remain the most closely watched shortfall. Domestic chip self-sufficiency, measured various ways, was estimated at roughly 40 to 50 percent heading into 2025, well short of the roadmap's 70 percent target, though up substantially from under 20 percent in 2015.[6][7] China's own government has since pushed the underlying self-sufficiency push out to 2030 and beyond rather than treating 2025 as a hard deadline.[6] Set against that, China's overall share of global manufacturing value-added climbed from roughly 8.5 percent in 2004 to a peak above 30 percent in 2021, settling at around 28 to 29 percent by the mid-2020s, still comfortably the largest share held by any single country.[22]

## From EVs and drones to humanoid robots

MIC2025's 2015 language on sector two, "high-end CNC machine tools and robotics," targeted industrial and factory automation, not humanoid robots, which barely existed as a commercial product category at the time; analysts researching China's current robotics buildout make the same point.[14] What MIC2025 built instead was the underlying industrial base, in electric vehicles, drones, and consumer electronics, that the humanoid-robot industry now draws on directly.

China produced about 12.4 million electric cars in 2024, more than 70 percent of global electric-car production that year, with Chinese-owned manufacturers accounting for over 80 percent of that domestic output, up from around two-thirds in 2021, according to the International Energy Agency.[15] That scale-up commoditized the batteries, precision motors, power electronics, and sensors that a humanoid robot also needs. In batteries specifically, CATL and BYD together supplied more than 55 percent of the roughly 1,187 gigawatt-hours of electric-vehicle batteries used worldwide in 2025, with CATL alone holding close to 39 percent, per industry tracker CnEVPost.[16] Separately, [DJI](/wiki/dji), the Shenzhen-based drone maker, spent more than a decade refining high-torque motors and flight controllers at consumer-electronics scale and has controlled an estimated 70 to 90 percent of the global civilian drone market, depending on the segment and year measured, since the mid-2010s.[20] Robotic actuators draw on much of the same motor and controller manufacturing know-how.

A concrete illustration of the pipeline runs through [lidar](/wiki/lidar). [Hesai](/wiki/hesai), a NASDAQ-listed, Shanghai-based automotive lidar maker, ranked first worldwide in lidar revenue for a fourth consecutive year in 2024 with close to a third of the global market, according to data from Yole Group.[17] In late 2024, Hesai's three co-founders left to start [Sharpa](/wiki/sharpa), a robotics company with Singapore headquarters and Shanghai research and manufacturing operations, applying the same high-volume precision-manufacturing approach to a humanoid hand: the Sharpa Wave, a 22-[degree-of-freedom](/wiki/degrees_of_freedom) [dexterous hand](/wiki/dexterous_hand) built to match human size and tactile sensitivity.[21] In June 2026, NVIDIA unveiled an open humanoid reference platform, announced by chief executive Jensen Huang at Computex in Taipei, that pairs a chassis from [Unitree](/wiki/unitree) with Sharpa's hands and [NVIDIA](/wiki/nvidia) computing and [Isaac GR00T](/wiki/isaac_gr00t) robotics software; the company said the platform would go on sale that October, with research labs including Stanford's Robotics Center and ETH Zurich already committed to using it.[24] [XPeng](/wiki/xpeng_iron), an electric-vehicle maker, unveiled its own humanoid, Iron, at its AI Day on November 8, 2024. The 1.73-meter, 70-kilogram robot has more than 60 joints and 200 degrees of freedom, runs on XPeng's own Turing AI chip, and was already assembling parts of the company's P7+ electric vehicle on the factory floor at launch, echoing Tesla's earlier move from electric vehicles into the [Tesla Optimus](/wiki/tesla_optimus) humanoid program.[25]

In December 2025, CATL said it had begun deploying Xiaomo humanoid robots, built by startup Spirit AI, at scale on its EV battery assembly lines at the Zhongzhou base in Luoyang, where the robots plug in high-voltage battery connectors with a reported 99 percent success rate and roughly triple the daily output of a human worker; CATL called it a world first for at-scale humanoid deployment in factory operations. The robots run on a [vision-language-action model](/wiki/vision_language_action_model) and are powered by CATL's own batteries.[26]

Rare-earth-derived permanent magnets, essential to the compact, high-torque motors used in both electric-vehicle drivetrains and humanoid-robot actuators, form another link in the chain. China accounts for roughly 90 percent of global rare-earth separation, processing, and magnet production, according to the International Energy Agency, a concentration that has become one of the recurring flashpoints in the same US-China technology dispute that produced the Section 301 tariffs.[28]

Chinese industrial policy has treated this transition from adjacent industries to purpose-built humanoid hardware as a matter of explicit state priority, not an accident of market forces. MIIT's "Guiding Opinions on the Innovation and Development of Humanoid Robots," issued November 2, 2023, set a goal of establishing a preliminary humanoid-robot innovation system and achieving breakthroughs in what the document called "brain, cerebellum, and limb" technologies by 2025, followed by a secure domestic supply chain and an internationally competitive industrial ecosystem by 2027, a two-stage structure that echoes MIC2025's own 2020/2025 target design.[10] Around the same time, in November 2023, the Beijing Humanoid Robot Innovation Center was registered in the Beijing Economic-Technological Development Area as China's first provincial-level humanoid-robotics innovation center, jointly built by robot makers, core-component suppliers, and large-model developers, reportedly including Xiaomi's robotics unit, [UBTECH](/wiki/ubtech), Jingcheng Machinery and Electronics, and the Institute of Automation at the Chinese Academy of Sciences; it unveiled the Tiangong humanoid robot in April 2024 and was redesignated a National-Local Jointly Built Embodied Intelligence Robotics Innovation Center in October 2024.[13] Shanghai has pursued a parallel track, combining its municipal humanoid-robotics fund with a dedicated Action Plan for the Development of the Embodied Intelligence Industry covering 2025 to 2028.[9]

Embodied AI, the framing under which China now discusses humanoid and other physically capable robots, sits inside the broader [China AI](/wiki/china_ai) policy landscape and appeared for the first time as a named national priority in the March 2025 Government Work Report, alongside biomanufacturing, quantum technology, and 6G, and was carried into the 15th Five-Year Plan as a designated "future industry."[9] A companion "Robot Plus" and "AI Plus Manufacturing" policy push set a goal of roughly doubling manufacturing robot density by 2030.[9] Financing followed the policy signal: Chinese humanoid-robot companies raised about $769 million in 2023 and more than $997 million in the first half of 2024 alone across more than twenty financing rounds, according to the USCC, with first-half 2025 humanoid financing exceeding RMB 10 billion (roughly $1.4 billion), per the Jamestown Foundation.[11][12] MIIT set a goal of cultivating two to three globally leading Chinese humanoid-robot firms by 2025, in a fast-growing domestic field that includes Unitree, UBTECH, and [Agibot](/wiki/agibot) alongside global competitors such as [Tesla](/wiki/tesla), [Boston Dynamics](/wiki/boston_dynamics), and [Figure](/wiki/figure_ai).[11]

The USCC's own assessment cautions against reading this buildout as a settled outcome. It found Chinese humanoid robots competitive on size and speed but still behind Western and Japanese rivals on hardware precision, durability, and key sensor technologies, and flagged China's military-civil fusion policy, under which civilian technology development can be redirected to military use, as a specific area of concern for humanoid-robot programs.[11] In that sense, the humanoid-robot supply chain inherited both MIC2025's strengths, in batteries, motors, castings, and high-volume assembly, and its most persistent weakness: continued dependence on the most advanced imported chips, the same semiconductor gap that MIC2025's own roadmap targets have yet to close.[6][7]

## Assessment

A decade on, Made in China 2025 resists a single verdict. By the numeric targets it originally set, China's own government-linked advisory bodies would count roughly half of the ten sectors as substantially achieved and the rest as partial or missed, with semiconductors the largest visible gap and new-energy vehicles the clearest overshoot.[6][7] By its broader strategic aim, building the industrial and financial machinery to move technology-intensive manufacturing onshore and extend it into unplanned adjacent industries such as humanoid robotics, independent reviewers on both sides of the trade dispute credit the plan with real, durable effect, even as they disagree sharply on whether that effect has been good for the global trading system.[7][8]

## See also

- [Robotics](/wiki/robotics)
- [Humanoid robot](/wiki/humanoid_robot)
- [Embodied AI](/wiki/embodied_ai)
- [China AI](/wiki/china_ai)
- [Unitree](/wiki/unitree)
- [DJI](/wiki/dji)
- [Sharpa](/wiki/sharpa)

## References

1. Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University. "Notice of the State Council on the Publication of 'Made in China 2025.'" Translation of Guofa [2015] No. 28. https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/notice-of-the-state-council-on-the-publication-of-made-in-china-2025/
2. Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Made in China 2025." https://www.csis.org/analysis/made-china-2025
3. Wubbeke, Jost, Mirjam Meissner, Max J. Zenglein, Jaqueline Ives, and Bjorn Conrad. "Made in China 2025." MERICS Papers on China No. 2, Mercator Institute for China Studies, December 2016. https://merics.org/en/report/made-china-2025
4. Council on Foreign Relations. "Is 'Made in China 2025' a Threat to Global Trade?" https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/made-china-2025-threat-global-trade
5. PBS Frontline. "Made in China 2025: The Industrial Plan That China Doesn't Want Anyone Talking About." https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/made-in-china-2025-the-industrial-plan-that-china-doesnt-want-anyone-talking-about/
6. US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. "Made in China 2025: Evaluating China's Performance." November 14, 2025. https://www.uscc.gov/research/made-china-2025-evaluating-chinas-performance
7. Rhodium Group. "Was Made in China 2025 Successful?" May 5, 2025. https://rhg.com/research/was-made-in-china-2025-successful/
8. CNBC. "Where 'Made in China 2025' Missed the Mark," reporting on the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China's assessment. April 18, 2025. https://www.cnbc.com/2025/04/18/where-made-in-china-2025-missed-the-mark.html
9. Merics. "Embodied AI: China's Ambitious Path to Transform Its Robotics Industry." https://merics.org/en/report/embodied-ai-chinas-ambitious-path-transform-its-robotics-industry
10. Digital Policy Alert / Akin Gump AI Law and Regulation Tracker. "Guiding Opinions on the Innovation and Development of Humanoid Robots." Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, November 2, 2023. https://www.akingump.com/en/insights/ai-law-and-regulation-tracker/guiding-opinions-on-the-innovation-and-development-of-humanoid-robots
11. US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. "Humanoid Robots." October 10, 2024. https://www.uscc.gov/research/humanoid-robots
12. Jamestown Foundation. "Embodied Intelligence: The PRC's Whole-of-Nation Push into Robotics." https://jamestown.org/embodied-intelligence-the-prcs-whole-of-nation-push-into-robotics/
13. Beijing Municipal Government. "Beijing Establishes Humanoid Robot Innovation Center." November 2023. https://english.beijing.gov.cn/latest/news/202311/t20231105_3295012.html
14. TechCrunch. "Why China's Humanoid Robot Industry Is Winning the Early Market." February 28, 2026. https://techcrunch.com/2026/02/28/why-chinas-humanoid-robot-industry-is-winning-the-early-market/
15. International Energy Agency. "Trends in the Electric Car Industry," Global EV Outlook 2025. https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2025/trends-in-the-electric-car-industry-3
16. CnEVPost. "Global EV Battery Market Share in 2025: Full Rankings and Key Takeaways." February 4, 2026. https://cnevpost.com/2026/02/04/global-ev-battery-market-share-2025/
17. Automotive World, citing Yole Group data via Hesai Group. "Lidar Industry Enters Mass Adoption Phase, Hesai Remains Leader in Global Market Share." https://www.automotiveworld.com/news-releases/lidar-industry-enters-mass-adoption-phase-hesai-remains-leader-in-global-market-share/
18. TrendForce / CNN Business. "China Chip Industry Gets $47.5 Billion in New Funding." May 27, 2024. https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/27/tech/china-semiconductor-investment-fund-intl-hnk
19. The State Council of the People's Republic of China (English site). "China Sets Up National Manufacturing Fund." November 20, 2019. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/topnews/201911/20/content_WS5dd49244c6d0bcf8c4c17753.html
20. CKGSB Knowledge. "DJI's Growth Challenges Under US Drone Regulations." Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business. https://english.ckgsb.edu.cn/knowledge/article/dji-growth-challenges-under-us-drone-regulations/
21. Pandaily. "Hesai's Three Co-Founders Launch New General Robotics Startup Sharpa." https://pandaily.com/hesai-s-three-co-founders-launch-new-general-robotics-startup-sharpa
22. Statista. "China Is the World's Manufacturing Superpower." https://www.statista.com/chart/20858/top-10-countries-by-share-of-global-manufacturing-output/
23. China Briefing. "The China Standards 2035 Plan: Is It a Follow-Up to Made in China 2025?" https://www.china-briefing.com/news/what-is-china-standards-2035-plan-how-will-it-impact-emerging-technologies-what-is-link-made-in-china-2025-goals/
24. Techloy. "Meet the Singapore Startup Behind Nvidia's First Open Humanoid Robot." https://www.techloy.com/who-is-sharpa-the-singapore-startup-behind-nvidias-first-open-humanoid-robot/
25. Interesting Engineering. "China's XPeng Unveils Humanoid Robot With 60 Joints for Factory Tasks." November 2024. https://interestingengineering.com/innovation/china-xpeng-iron-humanoid-robot
26. South China Morning Post. "China's CATL Marks Trailblazing Deployment of Humanoid Robots at Scale on the Factory Floor." December 2025. https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3336939/chinas-catl-marks-trailblazing-deployment-humanoid-robots-scale-factory-floor
27. Orcasia. "Institutionalisation of Self-Reliance in China's Technological Strategy." https://orcasia.org/article/1654/institutionalization-of-self-reliance-in-chinas-technological-strategy
28. International Energy Agency. "China's Share in Rare Earth Magnet Production, 2024." https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/china-s-share-in-rare-earth-magnet-production-2024
29. Federal Register / Office of the United States Trade Representative. "Notice of Action: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Targeting of the Semiconductor Industry for Dominance." December 29, 2025. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/12/29/2025-23912/notice-of-action-chinas-acts-policies-and-practices-related-to-targeting-of-the-semiconductor