CXMT (ChangXin Memory Technologies)

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ChangXin Memory Technologies, almost always shortened to CXMT, is China's largest maker of dynamic random-access memory and the only Chinese memory company big enough to appear in global DRAM market-share tables. The firm was created in Hefei in 2016 by the city's state investment arm together with the fabless designer GigaDevice, built its technology base on DRAM patents bought out of the wreckage of the German maker Qimonda, and shipped its first DDR4 parts in 2019. Its own listing prospectus, citing Omdia, put it fourth worldwide with 7.67 percent of global DRAM sales in the fourth quarter of 2025.[1][2]

The holding company, Changxin Technology Group, listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange's STAR Market on July 27, 2026 under stock code 688825. The offering raised RMB 57.919 billion (about US$8.6 billion) at RMB 8.66 per share, the largest listing on the STAR Market since the board opened in 2019 and the biggest initial public offering in Asia that year. The stock closed its first session at RMB 49, up 465.82 percent, which made CXMT the most valuable company listed in mainland China.[3][4][5][6]

For an encyclopedia of artificial intelligence the reason CXMT matters is not commodity memory. It is High Bandwidth Memory. HBM decides how fast an AI accelerator can feed its arithmetic units, and since December 2024 the United States has required a license to export HBM above a defined bandwidth density to China, which cuts Huawei and every other domestic accelerator designer off from Korean and American supply.[7] HBM is stacked DRAM, so whoever makes the DRAM dies sets the ceiling. In China that is overwhelmingly CXMT, which is why its HBM progress is the most closely watched variable in the country's AI hardware chain.

Two confusions are worth clearing up at the outset. CXMT is not YMTC, the Wuhan NAND flash maker added to the US Entity List in December 2022. Nor is it Fujian Jinhua, a much smaller DRAM project added to the Entity List in October 2018 after a US trade-secrets case involving Micron. CXMT has never been placed on the Entity List, though it does carry other US designations described below.[8][9][10]

Corporate history and ownership

CXMT's origins are municipal rather than corporate. Hefei, the capital of Anhui province, had already used its own balance sheet to anchor the display maker BOE, and in 2016 it applied the same method to memory under a project known internally as "506". Hefei Industry Investment Holding, controlled by the city's state assets commission, supplied 80 percent of an initial RMB 18 billion of capital. GigaDevice, a Beijing-listed NOR flash and microcontroller designer, took the other 20 percent and contributed engineering, management and customer access.[1]

Zhu Yiming led the venture. He had founded GigaDevice after studying physics at Tsinghua University, taking an electronic engineering degree at the State University of New York at Stony Brook and working in chip design in the United States, where he watched the memory industry migrate from America to East Asia. He moved to CXMT full time in 2018 and took no salary until the company turned a profit, a commitment that ran eight years while accumulated losses passed RMB 36.6 billion by 2025.[4]

Neither the city nor GigaDevice brought any DRAM technology, because neither had any. CXMT instead bought thousands of DRAM patents from the estate of Qimonda, the Infineon memory spin-off that collapsed in 2009, and recruited engineers from across the industry. The first product built on that base entered mass production in 2019.[1]

After the 2026 listing, Hefei-controlled companies and funds still hold roughly 30 percent of the group, mostly through Hefei Industry Investment Holding. Zhu has said he will distribute about half of his own post-listing stake, worth roughly RMB 20 billion, to employees.[4][11]

The Hefei model

CXMT is the showpiece of what Chinese commentators call the "Hefei model": a city government acting as an equity investor rather than a subsidy dispenser, picking a strategically important industry, taking a large early stake in an anchor company, building a local supply chain around it, and keeping a technically credible minority partner in the deal. Hefei backed BOE in 2008 and led a rescue round for the electric-vehicle maker NIO in 2020 when it was running out of cash. CXMT is the third and largest instance.[11]

The listing turned that method into a headline number. KrASIA reported on July 30, 2026 that the city's stake was worth several tens of billions of US dollars after the debut, and quoted Edward Tse of Gao Feng Advisory saying that Beijing's praise for the model was "a strong enough motivation for local governments to at least replicate" it.[11] The obvious caveat is survivorship: the same method has produced expensive failures elsewhere in China, and CXMT's returns rest on a memory price cycle that turned violently in its favor during 2025 and 2026.

Products and process technology

CXMT's public catalogue is conventional DRAM: DDR4 chips and modules, LPDDR4X, DDR5 chips and modules, and LPDDR5 and LPDDR5X. The company does not advertise HBM or graphics DRAM on its own site.[12]

Product familyStatus
DDR4, DDR4 modulesIn production since 2019, the original volume product
LPDDR4XIn production, the basis of CXMT's mobile DRAM share
DDR5, DDR5 modulesIn production; retail kits reach DDR5-6000 and higher
LPDDR5, LPDDR5X8533 Mbps and 9600 Mbps in mass production since May 2025; 10667 Mbps in customer trials as of October 2025
HBMNot offered commercially as of mid-2026

CXMT says its LPDDR5X delivers a 66 percent bandwidth improvement over LPDDR5 with about 30 percent lower power, and sells it as 12Gb and 16Gb dies, 12GB to 24GB packages, and 16GB and 32GB LPCAMM modules.[13]

Process node naming in DRAM is a marketing exercise even at the leading edge, and Chinese node names are harder still to pin down, so the published figures should be read as approximations. SemiAnalysis reported in June 2026 that CXMT's G4 generation, roughly equivalent to the industry's 1z node, carries most of the company's 2026 output, and that a G5 generation equivalent to 1a is in development without access to extreme ultraviolet lithography.[14] A teardown circulated in the enthusiast press measured a CXMT 16Gb DDR5 die at 68.06 mm2 (8.25 by 8.25 mm) against 48.90 mm2 for a comparable Samsung part, about 40 percent larger. The die measurement is what the teardown reports; the node figures circulating alongside it come from a reader comment on the same page rather than from the teardown, and are not used here. Those dimensions are close to what the industry shipped when DDR5 launched in 2021, which puts CXMT roughly four to five years behind on density.[15]

That gap has not kept the parts out of retail. Chinese module brands including Gloway and KingBank sell CXMT-based DDR5, Corsair has used CXMT dies in Vengeance kits, MSI has added BIOS validation for CXMT modules up to DDR5-8200 on dual-DIMM boards, and HP and Dell have been qualifying CXMT memory. CXMT has publicly demonstrated DDR5-8000 and LPDDR5X-10667.[16]

HBM and China's AI accelerators

The strategic question around CXMT is whether it can build HBM in volume. Chinese accelerator designers, from Huawei Ascend through Cambricon, Biren, Moore Threads and Enflame, all need stacked memory, and the December 2024 US rule that created ECCN 3A090.c and License Exception HBM in 15 CFR 740.25 made foreign HBM above a memory bandwidth density threshold a licensed item for China. Systems such as Huawei CloudMatrix 384 exist in part to compensate for memory and interconnect constraints with sheer scale-out.[7]

The public record on CXMT's HBM program is thin and much of it is reported rather than confirmed by the company. A ChinaTalk survey published in April 2025 placed HBM2 in mass production during the second half of 2024, expected HBM3 mass production in the first half of 2026 and put HBM3e at 2027, describing CXMT as three to four years behind the leaders rather than the six to eight often assumed. That survey also noted that HBM3e would need sub-15nm DRAM, which is difficult without EUV, that US controls cover through-silicon via and etch tools, that American field-service staff had left CXMT, and that the company had stockpiled equipment thought sufficient into 2026 or 2027.[17]

DIGITIMES reported on October 23, 2025 that CXMT had delivered 16nm-class HBM3 samples to Huawei and its partners ahead of larger-scale manufacturing targeted for 2026. That linkage is a press report, not a company statement, and a schematic map of China's chip geography published in July 2026 likewise marks the CXMT-to-Huawei HBM3 connection as reported rather than confirmed. It should be read that way.[18][19] TrendForce, citing Chosun Biz, separately reported in September 2025 that CXMT had restarted large capital spending it had paused, to expand DDR5 and advance HBM3 on a new Hefei line. The same report noted that Huawei's own Ascend roadmap starts with the Ascend 950PR in the first quarter of 2026 using HBM Huawei developed itself, so CXMT is not the only domestic route to stacked memory.[20]

SemiAnalysis put numbers on the effort in June 2026: roughly 5,000 wafer starts per month allocated to HBM in 2025, about 30,000 in 2026 and about 55,000 in 2027, with HBM3 8-high yields estimated at roughly 35 percent front-end multiplied by roughly 70 percent back-end, or about 25 percent overall. Those are analyst estimates, not disclosed figures, and a quarter of good stacks is a costly place to be.[14]

Two pieces of evidence argue for caution about the near-term commercial picture. The IPO prospectus directs proceeds to conventional DRAM lines, technology upgrades and forward-looking research rather than a standalone HBM plant, and Chinese coverage of the listing in July 2026 described HBM as still unresolved on yield with no commercial production.[5][21] The honest summary is that CXMT has the DRAM base and the packaging partners to attempt HBM, has sampled parts, and had not by mid-2026 demonstrated volume supply.

Manufacturing sites and capacity

SiteRoleNotes
Hefei, economic and technological development zoneOriginal 12-inch fabDDR4 and LPDDR4 from 2019
Hefei, XinqiaoLarger multi-phase complexDDR5, LPDDR5 and HBM base dies; a further phase under construction as of July 2026, per a schematic compilation of China's chip geography
BeijingThird 12-inch DRAM fabRamping through 2026
ShanghaiNew fab in developmentReported by Nikkei Asia as two to three times the size of the Hefei headquarters, with equipment installation from late 2026 and volume production targeted for 2027; a July 2026 compilation places it at Lingang alongside an HBM packaging plant

Nikkei Asia reported in February 2026 that the Hefei and Beijing plants were already running at full capacity, which is the immediate reason for the Shanghai project.[22]

Capacity numbers for Chinese memory makers vary widely between analysts and none of them come from the company, so they should always be quoted with the estimator attached. Two of the more careful 2026 estimates broadly agree.

EstimateEnd 2025End 2026End 2027End 2028
SemiAnalysis, June 2026 (12-inch wafer starts per month)about 265,000about 350,000about 420,000about 500,000, roughly 17 percent of global DRAM supply
Citrini Research, cited by Tom's Hardware, July 2026not givenabout 350,000, against Micron at about 375,000, SK Hynix at about 590,000 and Samsung at about 720,000not givennot given

For scale, TrendForce reported in November 2024 that CXMT's total monthly DRAM capacity had grown from about 40,000 wafers per month in 2020 to about 160,000, with about 200,000 expected by the end of 2024 and 300,000 by the end of 2025.[23] SemiAnalysis put Micron's end-2026 capacity at about 385,000 wafer starts per month, so on both estimates CXMT ends 2026 close to, but still below, the smallest of the three incumbents.[14][24]

The July 2026 STAR Market listing

ItemFigure
Listing dateJuly 27, 2026, Shanghai Stock Exchange STAR Market
Listed entity and codeChangxin Technology Group, 688825
Issue priceRMB 8.66 per share
Shares issuedabout 6.688 billion, 10 percent of enlarged capital
Gross proceedsRMB 57.919 billion, about US$8.6 billion; up to about RMB 66.6 billion if the over-allotment option is exercised in full
Implied value at issue priceabout RMB 579.19 billion
Retail subscription212 times covered, about 9.4 million accounts, about RMB 7.07 trillion of applications
First-day tradingClose RMB 49, up 465.82 percent (China Daily); TrendForce reports RMB 49.50 as a 471.6 percent gain; TechNode reports RMB 54.65 at the midday break, up 531 percent

The raise beat SMIC's RMB 53.2 billion in 2020 to become the largest offering on the STAR Market since the board launched in 2019, and TechNode called it the largest mainland Chinese semiconductor offering on record. Proceeds are allocated as RMB 7.5 billion to upgrading memory wafer production lines, RMB 13 billion to a DRAM technology upgrade that is part of a larger RMB 18 billion investment, and RMB 9 billion to forward-looking research, RMB 29.5 billion in total.[3][5]

Post-debut market capitalization is where the reporting diverges, so the figures are best quoted as each outlet gave them rather than averaged. TrendForce put it at about RMB 3.3 trillion, which it converted to about US$487 billion and compared to Intel at US$464 billion and Cisco at US$450 billion. China Daily reported a market value above RMB 3 trillion, about US$443 billion. Other coverage of the debut has used a substantially lower trillion-yuan figure, and the discrepancy has not been reconciled from published sources. What is not disputed is the ranking: on debut CXMT became the most valuable company listed in mainland China.[3][6]

The financial backdrop explains the enthusiasm. CXMT reported first-quarter 2026 revenue of RMB 50.8 billion, up 719.13 percent year on year, with net profit attributable to shareholders of RMB 24.762 billion, up 1,688.30 percent, and guided to first-half 2026 revenue of RMB 110 billion to 120 billion and first-half net profit of RMB 50 billion to 57 billion against a RMB 2.3 billion loss a year earlier. Those numbers reflect a memory price cycle at least as much as they reflect CXMT's execution.[3][6]

What the listing signals is less about one company than about who finances the next memory cycle. A domestic DRAM supplier that can raise nine billion dollars on its home exchange, at a valuation that briefly made it the largest listed company on the mainland market, no longer depends on the patience of a single municipality.

This is the area where secondary coverage is least reliable, because Chinese memory makers are frequently lumped together. Three separate instruments apply, and they are not interchangeable.

The Entity List. CXMT is not on it. The rule that the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security published on December 5, 2024 added a long list of Chinese semiconductor entities, among them the tool makers NAURA, Piotech and ACM Research Shanghai, the EDA firm Empyrean, SiCarrier, and the memory-adjacent companies SwaySure and Wuhan Xinxin. The text of that rule does not mention ChangXin or CXMT anywhere. Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations, the Entity List itself, contains Fujian Jinhua (added October 30, 2018) and Yangtze Memory Technologies (added December 19, 2022) but no ChangXin entry as of August 2026.[8][9][10][25] CNBC reported on June 17, 2026 that an interagency committee had approved CXMT, DeepSeek and more than a hundred other companies for addition, that Commerce had not published any of them, and that the resulting gap was the longest in Entity List postings in over a decade, attributing the pause to Under Secretary Jeffrey Kessler's reluctance to escalate tensions with Beijing.[26] A designation therefore remains a live risk rather than a current fact.

Section 1260H. CXMT is designated. The Department of Defense first named "ChangXin Memory Technologies, Inc. (CXMT)" as a Chinese military company operating in the United States in its notice of January 7, 2025, and the current notice published June 10, 2026 (91 FR 35189) designates it again, stating that CXMT "is directly affiliated with MIIT and indirectly affiliated with SASAC and MIIT". CXMT does not appear in that notice's list of entities removed from the previous designation. Claims that CXMT was delisted from 1260H are contradicted by the primary document.[27][28]

Section 5949. CXMT is named in statute. Section 5949 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263) defines "covered semiconductor product or services" to include anything designed, produced or provided by "ChangXin Memory Technologies (CXMT) or Yangtze Memory Technologies Corp (YMTC) (or any subsidiary, affiliate, or successor of such entities)", alongside a parallel subparagraph naming SMIC. The prohibition bars executive agencies from procuring electronic products or services containing those semiconductors. A proposed Federal Acquisition Regulation rule published February 17, 2026 would implement it, with the prohibition taking effect December 23, 2027 and an extension to December 23, 2028 for certain commercial items without alternatives.[29][30]

Alongside these entity-specific measures, the country-wide AI chip export controls matter to CXMT in two directions. The December 2024 rules tightened controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment and created the HBM control described above, which limits what CXMT can buy while simultaneously removing its foreign competitors from the Chinese HBM market.[7][8]

Competitive position

CXMT is a distant fourth. TrendForce ranked it fourth among DRAM suppliers in the first quarter of 2026 with a 7.6 percent revenue share, against a combined 89.7 percent for Samsung, SK Hynix and Micron.[3] The prospectus figure of 7.67 percent for the fourth quarter of 2025 is attributed to Omdia and is likewise a share of sales, not of bits.[2] The distinction matters, because CXMT sells lower-density parts at lower prices: SemiAnalysis put its bit shipment share at about 9 percent in 2025, rising to about 12 percent by 2027, higher than its revenue share for exactly that reason.[14] Some quarterly DRAM revenue tabulations, including TrendForce's fourth-quarter 2025 table showing Samsung at 36.0 percent, SK Hynix at 32.1 percent and Micron at 22.4 percent, leave the remaining several percent unattributed rather than naming CXMT at all.[31]

SupplierBasisShare
SamsungQ4 2025 DRAM revenue, TrendForce36.0 percent
SK HynixQ4 2025 DRAM revenue, TrendForce32.1 percent
MicronQ4 2025 DRAM revenue, TrendForce22.4 percent
CXMTQ4 2025 DRAM sales, Omdia via CXMT prospectus7.67 percent
CXMTQ1 2026 DRAM revenue, TrendForce7.6 percent
CXMT2025 bit shipments, SemiAnalysis estimateabout 9 percent

The gap is structural, not just a matter of scale. SemiAnalysis reported that CXMT's DDR5 cost per bit remains more than 30 percent above the three leaders, and that its 2026 margins come from prices rather than from manufacturing efficiency.[14] Micron's chief executive Sanjay Mehrotra characterized Chinese competition as concentrated at the low end of the consumer market while Micron focused on data-centre parts.[32] CXMT's strongest position is in mobile DRAM, where its LPDDR4X supply has fed Chinese smartphone production.[32]

The equipment picture is the constraint most likely to decide how the gap evolves. CXMT buys heavily from domestic tool makers including NAURA and AMEC, and TrendForce reported on July 28, 2026 that Shanghai Yuliangsheng had begun mass-producing domestic immersion DUV scanners with first deliveries to SMIC, Hua Hong Semiconductor and CXMT expected during 2026, at a rate of roughly five machines in 2026 and about twenty in 2027. Key components still come from Japan, the tools are expected to trail ASML on performance and reliability, and none of this substitutes for EUV.[33]

Effect on global memory prices

CXMT's output has moved world prices twice, in opposite directions.

The first move was down. Through 2024 and into early 2025 CXMT poured DDR4 and LPDDR4X into a soft market. TrendForce reported in November 2024 that SK Hynix planned to cut DDR4 to 20 percent of its DRAM output by the end of that year, from 40 percent in June, and that Samsung executive vice president Kim Jae-joon had confirmed reductions in legacy DRAM and NAND, with both firms redirecting capacity to HBM and enterprise SSDs.[23] By February 5, 2025 TrendForce was attributing continued declines in DDR4 spot prices directly to CXMT's "plentiful" supply, with the mainstream 1Gx8 3200MT/s chip at US$1.458.[34] In January 2025 TrendForce projected that Chinese makers' combined DRAM share could double from about 5 percent in 2024 to about 10 percent in 2025, led by CXMT, while cautioning that CXMT's actual market presence lagged its nameplate capacity because of quality constraints.[32]

The second move was up, and CXMT was a beneficiary rather than a cause. Having pushed the incumbents out of legacy DRAM, the market then discovered that AI infrastructure was consuming every bit the industry could make. DRAM contract prices rose sharply through 2025 and 2026, global DRAM revenue reached US$53.58 billion in the fourth quarter of 2025 alone, and the same DDR4 parts that had been dumped at under two dollars became scarce.[31] SemiAnalysis's June 2026 assessment was that CXMT's improved margins came from that pricing environment rather than from any change in its cost structure.[14] The uncomfortable implication for buyers is that the cheapest supplier in the market stopped behaving like one.

Limitations and open questions

  • Lithography. CXMT has no EUV and, on current export controls, will not get any. Its G5 generation and anything below 15nm must be done with immersion DUV and multi-patterning, which costs cycles, yield and die area.[14][17][33]
  • Yield and cost. More than 30 percent higher cost per bit on DDR5 than the leaders, dies roughly 40 percent larger than a comparable Samsung part, and estimated HBM3 8-high yields around 25 percent are all analyst figures rather than disclosures, but they point the same way.[14][15]
  • HBM is unproven at volume. Sampling is not shipping. As of mid-2026 there was no confirmed commercial HBM production, and the IPO proceeds are not directed at a standalone HBM plant.[5][21]
  • Designation risk. An Entity List addition has been approved at the interagency level and withheld for policy reasons. If published, it would restrict CXMT's access to US-origin tooling, parts and service in a way the current 1260H designation does not.[26]
  • Estimate quality. Almost every capacity, share and yield figure in circulation is a third-party estimate. Analysts disagree by tens of thousands of wafers per month, and quarterly revenue tables from different firms do not even agree on whether to list CXMT at all.[14][24][31]
  • Cycle exposure. The 2026 financials and the valuation both rest on memory prices at the top of a historic upswing. Capacity being added by CXMT and by everyone else is the standard mechanism by which such upswings end.

See also

References

  1. ^Tsai-Yi Wang, "The Rise of CXMT", Research Institute for Democracy, Society, and Emerging Technology (DSET), December 9, 2025. dset.tw/...000411
  2. ^PANDAILY, "CXMT, DRAM localization and a trillion-yuan valuation", July 2026. pandaily.com/...ization-trillion-valuation-jul2026
  3. ^TrendForce, "CXMT's 471% STAR Debut Makes It China's Top Listed Firm, Reshaping Global Memory Dynamics", July 27, 2026. trendforce.com/...reshaping-global-memory-dynamics
  4. ^TrendForce, "CXMT IPO Could Raise Up to RMB 66.6B; How Founder Zhu Yiming Built China's DRAM Challenger", July 16, 2026. trendforce.com/...ing-built-chinas-dram-challenger
  5. ^TechNode, "CXMT becomes China's most valuable A-share company after $8.6 billion IPO", July 27, 2026. technode.com/...hare-company-after-8-6-billion-ipo
  6. ^China Daily, "CXMT shares surge on STAR Market debut", July 27, 2026. global.chinadaily.com.cn/...677137a310986e2b467906
  7. ^Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, 15 CFR 740.25, "License Exception High Bandwidth Memory (HBM)". ecfr.gov/...section-740.25
  8. ^Bureau of Industry and Security, "Additions and Modifications to the Entity List; Removals From the Validated End-User (VEU) Program", 89 FR 96830, December 5, 2024. federalregister.gov/...idated-end-user-veu-program
  9. ^Bureau of Industry and Security, "Addition of an Entity to the Entity List" (Fujian Jinhua), 83 FR 54519, October 30, 2018. federalregister.gov/...n-entity-to-the-entity-list
  10. ^Bureau of Industry and Security, "Additions and Revisions to the Entity List and Conforming Removal From the Unverified List" (YMTC), 87 FR 77505, December 19, 2022. federalregister.gov/...al-from-the-unverified-list
  11. ^KrASIA, "Hefei's CXMT jackpot fuels China local governments' tech bets", July 30, 2026. kr-asia.com/...s-china-local-governments-tech-bets
  12. ^ChangXin Memory Technologies, corporate website (products and company profile). cxmt.com/en
  13. ^TrendForce, "CXMT Confirms LPDDR5X Mass Production Began in May, High-speed Variant Under Customer Trials", October 29, 2025. trendforce.com/...ed-variant-under-customer-trials
  14. ^SemiAnalysis, "China's CXMT Is Set to Challenge DRAM", June 23, 2026. newsletter.semianalysis.com/...t-to-challenge-dram
  15. ^Tom's Hardware, "China-made DDR5 memory chips are nearly 40 percent larger than Samsung's DDR5 due to less advanced chipmaking technology". tomshardware.com/...advanced-chipmaking-technology
  16. ^Tom's Hardware, "Chinese memory vendors snub industry giants in favor of homegrown RAM chips", June 17, 2026. tomshardware.com/...-a-chinese-supply-chain-revolt
  17. ^ChinaTalk, "Mapping China's HBM Advances", April 17, 2025. chinatalk.media/...mapping-chinas-hbm-advancement
  18. ^DIGITIMES, "CXMT, Huawei align on HBM3 ahead of China's 2026 AI memory leap", October 23, 2025. digitimes.com/...cxmt-hbm3-2026-dram-huawei
  19. ^Andrew Stokols, "China's Indigenous Semiconductor Push: Hubs and Linkages", self-published interactive schematic compiled July 2026 from named secondary reporting. Not a primary source, and its own note states that linkages marked with a tilde are reported or attributed rather than company-confirmed. astoks.github.io/chinasemimap
  20. ^TrendForce, "China's NAND Giant YMTC Reportedly Moves into HBM Using TSV, Following CXMT and Huawei", September 26, 2025. trendforce.com/...ng-tsv-following-cxmt-and-huawei
  21. ^PANDAILY, "CXMT, DRAM localization and a trillion-yuan valuation" (HBM yield status), July 2026. pandaily.com/...ization-trillion-valuation-jul2026
  22. ^Tom's Hardware, "China's CXMT and YMTC to expand memory output" (citing Nikkei Asia), February 4, 2026. tomshardware.com/...d-ymtc-to-expand-memory-output
  23. ^TrendForce, "SK hynix and Samsung Reportedly to Reduce Legacy DRAM Production like DDR4 amid Chinese Competition", November 5, 2024. trendforce.com/...ke-ddr4-amid-chinese-competition
  24. ^Tom's Hardware, "CXMT close to matching Micron's memory capacity in 2026, research claims" (citing Citrini Research), July 15, 2026. tomshardware.com/...s-second-largest-dram-producer
  25. ^Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, Supplement No. 4 to Part 744, the Entity List. ecfr.gov/...Supplement%20No.%204%20to%20Part%20744
  26. ^CNBC, "US holds off on blacklisting DeepSeek, CXMT and other firms flagged as national security risks", June 17, 2026. cnbc.com/...lacklist-cxmt-national-security-risks-
  27. ^Department of Defense, "Notice of Availability of Designation of Chinese Military Companies", January 7, 2025. federalregister.gov/...-chinese-military-companies
  28. ^Department of Defense, "Notice of Availability of Designation of Chinese Military Companies", 91 FR 35189, June 10, 2026. federalregister.gov/...-chinese-military-companies
  29. ^James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, Public Law 117-263, section 5949. govinfo.gov/...PLAW-117publ263
  30. ^FAR Council, "Federal Acquisition Regulation: Prohibition on Certain Semiconductor Products and Services", proposed rule, February 17, 2026. federalregister.gov/...uctor-products-and-services
  31. ^Evertiq, "Price rally lifts 4Q25 DRAM revenue 29.4% QoQ" (TrendForce data), February 26, 2026. evertiq.com/...lly-lifts-4q25-dram-revenue-294-qoq
  32. ^TrendForce, "Chinese Memory Makers, Led by CXMT, Advance in the DRAM Market, Challenging Samsung, SK Hynix, and Micron", January 16, 2025. trendforce.com/...ging-samsung-sk-hynix-and-micron
  33. ^TrendForce, "China Reportedly Starts Mass Producing Immersion DUV Tools; SMIC, Hua Hong, CXMT Deliveries Expected This Year", July 28, 2026. trendforce.com/...mt-deliveries-expected-this-year
  34. ^TrendForce, "Memory Spot Price Update: DDR4 Prices Continue to Slide Due to CXMT's Abundant Supply", February 5, 2025. trendforce.com/...ide-due-to-cxmts-abundant-supply

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Fact-checks are independent of edits: a reviewer re-verifies the article against its sources and stamps the date. How we verify

Reviewer note: Independently fact-checked on 2026-08-01. The export-control position was confirmed against primary documents: CXMT is genuinely absent from the Entity List in Supplement No. 4 to Part 744, is designated on the Department of Defense Section 1260H list at 91 FR 35189 with a first designation of 7 January 2025, and is named in Section 5949 of the FY2023 NDAA at 136 STAT. 3492. A circulating claim that CXMT was delisted from 1260H in January 2026 is contradicted by the primary notice. Three corrections were applied: a process-node comparison rested on a reader comment rather than the teardown it cited, the first-day trading figures gave one outlet's number where three differ, and a TrendForce capacity series covers total DRAM output rather than DDR4 and LPDDR4X.

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