Hua Hong Grace Semiconductor

Hua Hong is the second-largest chip foundry in mainland China after SMIC, and the largest one whose entire business sits on mature specialty processes rather than leading-edge logic. It makes power management chips, embedded flash for microcontrollers, discrete power transistors, analogue parts, radio-frequency chips and image sensors on processes ranging from 0.35 micron down to 40nm, in three 200mm fabs in Shanghai and two 300mm fabs in Wuxi. It does not compete with TSMC for the chips that train and run AI models, and it never has.^[1][2][17]

The listed company was called Hua Hong Semiconductor Limited from its incorporation in Hong Kong in January 2005 until 27 May 2026, when it became Hua Hong Grace Semiconductor Limited (华虹宏力半导体有限公司). It trades in Hong Kong as 1347.HK and on the Shanghai STAR Market as 688347.SH, and its ultimate parent is the Shanghai State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (Shanghai SASAC).^[2][8] Revenue in 2025 was US$2,402.1 million, up 19.9% on 2024, on wafer shipments of 5.384 million 200mm-equivalent wafers and an average capacity utilisation of 106.1%.^[2]

That combination is the point of the company. Most coverage of Chinese semiconductors is about the leading edge and about export controls aimed at AI accelerators. Hua Hong sits on the other side of the industry, in the mature-node capacity where China has actually built scale that works commercially today, and where Western trade policy has spent the last two years worrying about oversupply rather than about China falling behind.

Several closely related entities share the Hua Hong name, and sources use them interchangeably. Unless stated otherwise, "Hua Hong" below means the listed company, now Hua Hong Grace Semiconductor Limited, and figures are the listed company's own rather than those of the wider Huahong Group.

What a specialty foundry is, and why Hua Hong is not a TSMC rival

A foundry manufactures chips designed by somebody else. The distinction that matters for Hua Hong is not who designs the chip but what kind of transistor is being built.

Leading-edge logic foundries compete on density. TSMC, Samsung Foundry and to a lesser extent SMIC chase smaller CMOS transistors so that a processor can pack more of them into the same die, which is what a GPU or a smartphone application processor needs. That race requires extreme ultraviolet lithography from ASML, and it is the race that US and allied export controls have been designed to slow.

Specialty foundries compete on device physics instead. A power MOSFET has to survive hundreds of volts. An IGBT has to switch tens of amps in an electric vehicle inverter. An embedded flash cell has to hold data for twenty years at automotive temperatures. A BCD process has to put bipolar, CMOS and DMOS devices on the same die so that one chip can contain both control logic and a high-voltage output stage. None of these get better by shrinking to 3nm; several get worse. They get better through process modules, device engineering and yield learning on relatively coarse geometries, which is why Hua Hong's most advanced platforms sit at 40nm and 55nm and a third of its revenue still comes from 0.35 micron and above.^[2]

The practical consequence is that a company can be locked out of EUV, as every Chinese fab is, and still be a completely normal competitor in its own segment. In 2025 Hua Hong drew 33.7% of revenue from nodes of 0.35 micron and larger, 25.3% from 65nm and below, and 24.3% from 90nm and 95nm.^[2] Nothing in that mix is affected by whether the company can buy an EUV scanner.

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Source: Hua Hong Semiconductor 2025 annual report.^[2]

Corporate history

Project 909 and Hua Hong NEC

The company descends from Project 909, one of the founding efforts of China's semiconductor industry. According to an account published by Sina Finance, the proposal was approved at a State Council premier's office meeting on 13 December 1995 and formally approved by the State Planning Commission on 29 March 1996, with the aim of narrowing the gap between Chinese and foreign integrated circuit manufacturing; the vehicle was a joint venture whose contract was signed at the Great Hall of the People on 28 May 1997, and which built what that account calls China's first 8-inch production line, planned at 0.5 micron.^[28] Shanghai Huahong Microelectronics Co., Ltd., the entity that became Huahong Group, was set up in 1996.^[3]

The joint venture, Shanghai Hua Hong NEC Electronics (HHNEC), was established on 17 July 1997 with Japan's NEC, with total investment of US$1.2 billion and paid-up registered capital of US$700 million. Shanghai Huahong Microelectronics contributed US$500 million for 71.4%, NEC US$130 million for 18.6%, and NEC (China) Co., Ltd. US$70 million for 10%.^[4]

HHNEC was built to make DRAM for NEC, not to be a foundry. It pilot-ran the DRAM line in 1999 and began power MOSFET production in 2002.^[3] It phased out DRAM in 2003 and started foundry services, gradually settling on embedded non-volatile memory, analogue and power management, high voltage and RF.^[4] Hua Hong Semiconductor Limited was incorporated in Hong Kong on 21 January 2005 as the offshore holding company for HHNEC, with Hua Hong International holding 61.42%, NEC 17.36%, Hylintek 11.22% and Newport Fab LLC 10%.^[2][4]

Grace Semiconductor

Grace Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation ("Grace Cayman") was incorporated in the Cayman Islands on 5 October 1999 and raised US$993.6 million in share capital.^[2][4] Its wholly-owned PRC operating company, Shanghai Grace Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation ("Grace Shanghai"), was established on 20 December 2000 with registered capital of US$700 million and began operations in 2003 as a pure-play foundry, initially on PC chipsets and standalone NOR flash.^[4] Immediately before the merger, Grace Cayman was 69.19% held by Shanghai Alliance Investment Limited (SAIL) through offshore subsidiaries, with Silicon Storage Technology at 9.59%, Cheung Kong/Hutchison Whampoa at 3.12%, Sanyo at 1.06% and other international investors holding the rest.^[4]

By 2006 both HHNEC and Grace Shanghai had converged on the same specialties, embedded non-volatile memory and power discrete technologies, leaving two separately capitalised 200mm foundries in the same city chasing the same platforms.^[4]

The merger and HHGrace

Hua Hong Semiconductor and Grace Cayman decided in 2009 to consolidate their businesses, which the listing document says was intended to increase operational efficiency, improve core competitiveness and improve access to global capital markets. The merger completed in December 2011, and the intra-group restructuring that consolidated the operating entities was substantially complete in October 2013.^[4] The merged PRC operating company, Shanghai Huahong Grace Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation, was incorporated in January 2013 and is the entity usually abbreviated HHGrace.^[2][3]

This is where the naming gets confusing, and the distinction matters when reading financial and market-share data:

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Two listings

Hua Hong Semiconductor listed on the Main Board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 2014.^[3] On 7 August 2023 it completed a second listing by issuing 407,750,000 RMB-denominated A shares on the Shanghai Stock Exchange's STAR Market at RMB52.00 per share, raising gross proceeds of RMB21,203 million and net proceeds of RMB20,921 million.^[2] The declared use of proceeds was RMB12.5 billion for the Hua Hong Manufacturing (Wuxi) project, RMB2.5 billion for specialty technology R&D, RMB2.0 billion for upgrading the 200mm fabs and RMB1.0 billion for working capital, with the remaining unutilised balance scheduled to be spent by the end of 2026.^[2]

Name change and the Huali Micro acquisition

At its STAR Market listing, Huahong Group undertook to inject Huali Micro into the listed company within three years, subject to government approvals.^[9] On 29 August 2025 the company agreed to acquire 97.4988% of Huali Micro from Huahong Group, the Shanghai IC Fund, China IC Fund II and the Guotou IC Fund, paid mostly in new A shares. A supplemental agreement of 31 December 2025 fixed the appraised value of Huali Micro at RMB8,480 million, the consideration for the 97.4988% stake at about RMB8,268 million, and the consideration shares at 190,768,392 at RMB43.34 each. Independent shareholders approved the deal at an extraordinary general meeting on 10 February 2026.^[2][9]

The special resolution to rename the company passed at the annual general meeting on 14 May 2026; the Hong Kong Companies Registry issued the certificate of change of name on 27 May 2026, and the stock short name changed to "HUA HONG GRACE" on 8 June 2026.^[8] The China Securities Regulatory Commission approved registration of the share issue on 8 July 2026, after which the company said all conditions precedent had been satisfied. The acquisition had not closed as of the end of July 2026.^[10]

Huali Micro's own numbers, disclosed in the transaction announcement, show why it matters: revenue of RMB4,988 million and net profit of RMB530 million in 2024, against a loss of RMB363 million in 2023.^[9]

Ownership

No single shareholder holds a majority. As at 31 December 2025 the disclosed substantial shareholders were Shanghai Hua Hong International (a wholly-owned subsidiary of Huahong Group) with 20.00%, and SAIL with 10.87% held indirectly, out of 1,737,614,193 shares in issue. The notes to the accounts name Huahong Group as the parent and Shanghai SASAC as the ultimate parent.^[2] Huahong Group, SAIL and INESA (Group) Co., Ltd. were the controlling shareholders at the time of the 2014 Hong Kong listing and gave a deed of non-competition dated 23 September 2014 which the company still reports against each year.^[2]

The China IC "Big Fund" has been a shareholder since before the STAR listing and has been reducing. China Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund Co., Ltd. held 178,705,925 shares, or 13.67%, at the end of 2022 through Xinxin (Hong Kong) Capital and Xun Xin (Shanghai) Investment. That fell to 118,495,939 shares, or 6.90%, at the end of 2024, and the fund no longer appears in the 5%-and-above disclosure table for 31 December 2025.^[2][11][12] The Big Fund remains present further down the structure: China IC Fund holds 20.58% of Hua Hong Semiconductor (Wuxi) Limited, and China IC Fund II holds 29.00% of Hua Hong Semiconductor Manufacturing (Wuxi) Co., Ltd. plus 48,334,249 A shares.^[2]

Those minority stakes in the Wuxi subsidiaries explain an oddity in the accounts. The group reported a loss of US$110.8 million for 2025, but a profit of US$54.9 million attributable to owners of the parent, because US$165.7 million of losses fell to non-controlling interests, mostly the state funds and Wuxi municipal vehicles that co-financed the new 300mm fabs.^[2]

Process platforms

Hua Hong organises its business into five specialty platforms. The company reports revenue against them directly.^[2]

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Embedded non-volatile memory is the microcontroller business. A large share of the world's MCUs need flash on the same die as the CPU, and the flash module is the hard part of the process. Hua Hong's platforms cover 200mm at 0.35 micron to 90nm and 300mm at 90nm to 40nm. In 2025 the company said 40nm customised eFlash products entered pre-production and the 55nm eFlash platform reached large-scale mass production, with several platforms shipping automotive-grade parts in volume.^[2][22] The same platform underpins smart card chips: the company says financial IC cards built on its eNVM process earned CC EAL5+ and EMVCo security certification and Mastercard CQM certification in 2016.^[3]

Analogue and power management is the fastest-growing line and the one most directly touched by the AI build-out, though at one remove. Revenue rose 41.4% in 2025 on what the company attributed to AI-supporting power applications and mobile phones. AI servers need enormous numbers of power management ICs and voltage regulators, none of which are made at leading-edge nodes. Technically, 2025 brought a 0.18 micron BCD 120V platform aimed at 48V automotive systems, stable mass production on 90nm BCD, and "BCD+" variants including BCD combined with eFlash.^[2][24]

Power discrete is the oldest specialty, going back to HHNEC's power MOSFET production in 2002.^[3] The company describes itself as the first foundry able to make power discretes on both 200mm and 300mm lines, and calls its Wuxi line the world's first 300mm power semiconductor foundry.^[1][23] In 2025 the share of IGBT output using the 1.6 micron IGBT process rose quickly, aimed at electric vehicle traction inverters, wind, photovoltaic and energy storage. The company also reported gallium nitride process development for high-performance motor drives and high-voltage DC systems.^[2]

Logic and RF covers general logic plus RF CMOS, RF-SOI, CMOS image sensors and MEMS. In 2025 a 40nm ultra-low-power specialty process entered mass production for IoT and wearables, 55/40nm and RFCMOS processes continued in stable production, the 65nm RF-SOI platform grew, and the company said its CIS process for smartphone main cameras was positioned for mobile imaging and automotive vision.^[2][25]

Fabs and capacity

The listed company runs five fabs. Its own fab list skips numbers 4, 5, 6 and 8, because the numbering runs across the wider Huahong Group rather than across the listed company alone: Reuters reported in April 2026 that a Fab 6 in Shanghai running 28/22nm and a Fab 8a under construction were covered by US equipment restrictions, and neither is among the five fabs the company lists as its own.^[5][16]

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For environmental and social reporting the company groups Fabs 1 to 3 as the Shanghai Production Base and Fabs 7 and 9 as the Wuxi Production Base.^[2]

Fab 9 is the growth story of the last three years and the reason group capacity has moved so fast. Total capacity was 391,000 200mm-equivalent wafers per month at the end of 2024, 486,000 at the end of 2025 and 489,000 at the end of the first quarter of 2026, a 24.4% increase across 2025.^[2][6][7] The company said the phase one capacity target for Fab 9 was reached by the end of 2025, with phase two equipment move-in continuing and the planned capacity target set for the third quarter of 2026.^[2]

The mix has shifted with it. In the first quarter of 2026, 300mm wafers produced US$414.5 million of revenue against US$246.4 million from 200mm, so 300mm reached 62.7% of the total, up from 57.3% a year earlier.^[6]

The company defines capacity utilisation as average monthly equivalent wafer output divided by total estimated monthly capacity, so figures above 100% mean running above nameplate rather than a reporting error. Utilisation stayed above 100% through 2025 on both wafer sizes: 103.2% in the fourth quarter of 2024, 109.5% in the third quarter of 2025 and 103.8% in the fourth quarter of 2025, then 99.7% in the first quarter of 2026 as capacity additions outpaced output growth.^[6][7]

Financial results

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Source: Hua Hong Semiconductor five-year financial summary and financial highlights; gross margins for 2021 and 2022 are computed from the reported revenue and gross profit.^[2]

The shape of that table is the mature-node cycle: a peak in 2021 and 2022 during the global chip shortage, a two-year slide in gross margin from 34.1% to 10.2%, and a recovery in volume from 2025 that has not yet restored margin. The company attributes the 2025 gross profit improvement to better average selling prices and cost reduction, partly offset by higher depreciation, which is the cost of the new Wuxi lines arriving before their full revenue does. Revenue recovered 19.9% in 2025 but gross margin only reached 11.8%, and the group still made a net loss of US$110.8 million, with the profit attributable to owners surviving only because US$165.7 million of losses fell to the Wuxi minority interests.^[2]

The most recent reported quarter, the first of 2026, showed revenue of US$660.9 million, up 22.2% year on year and 0.2% on the previous quarter, gross margin of 13.0%, and profit attributable to owners of US$20.9 million against US$3.75 million a year earlier. Guidance for the second quarter was US$690 million to US$700 million at a 14% to 16% gross margin.^[6] Second-quarter results were scheduled for board approval on 13 August 2026.^[27]

R&D costs were US$276.2 million in 2025, up from US$228.3 million in 2024. Headcount was 7,628 at the end of 2025, of whom 1,427, or 19.06%, were R&D personnel.^[2]

Customers and end markets

Hua Hong sells overwhelmingly to fabless chip companies rather than to integrated device manufacturers: 96.7% of 2025 revenue came from systems and fabless companies and 3.3% from IDMs.^[2] The company does not name customers in its filings, and the concentration is low for a foundry. The largest single customer accounted for about 8.6% of 2025 revenue and the five largest for about 34.2%.^[2] That points to a broad base of design houses rather than a handful of anchor accounts, which is a structural difference from leading-edge foundries whose economics depend on a few very large customers.

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Source: Hua Hong Semiconductor 2025 annual report.^[2]

Geographically, 82.2% of 2025 revenue came from China, 10.2% from North America, 4.8% from other Asia and 2.8% from Europe. North American revenue grew 31.0% in 2025 and 51.9% year on year in the first quarter of 2026, which the company attributed to demand for power management ICs and MCUs.^[2][6] Computing, at 1.5% of revenue, is a useful sanity check on how far the company sits from AI silicon: its exposure to the AI build-out is through the power and analogue parts that surround accelerators, not through the accelerators.

Position in the global foundry rankings

Quarterly foundry revenue share tables are published by market research firms, and the Hua Hong entry in them is not the listed company. TrendForce ranks "HuaHong Group", consolidating HHGrace with HLMC. That is why TrendForce put HuaHong Group's fourth-quarter 2025 revenue at about US$1.22 billion in a quarter when the listed company reported US$659.9 million of its own.^[7][17]

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In both quarters TrendForce placed TSMC first, at a 70.4% market share in the fourth quarter of 2025 and 72% in the first quarter of 2026, Samsung Foundry second, SMIC third at about US$2.5 billion, UMC fourth and GlobalFoundries fifth, with Tower, Nexchip, Vanguard and PSMC filling the rest of the top ten.^[17][18] The gap between TSMC and everyone else is the clearest available statement of the point made above: these companies are not in the same market.

TrendForce attributed HHGrace's fourth-quarter 2025 performance to MCU and PMIC demand, and said in the first quarter of 2026 that modest wafer shipment growth was largely offset by falling average selling prices.^[17][18]

Export controls and trade policy

Hua Hong is not on the Entity List

Hua Hong is not listed on the US Bureau of Industry and Security Entity List. A search of the full text of Supplement No. 4 to 15 CFR Part 744, as current on 30 July 2026, returns no entry for Hua Hong, Huahong, HHGrace, Hua Hong Grace or Huali Micro, while SMIC, SiCarrier, NAURA and other Chinese semiconductor entities do appear.^[13] This matters because coverage of Chinese chipmakers often treats Entity List designation as universal. The list's own Federal Register citations date SMIC's addition to 85 FR 83420 of 22 December 2020, YMTC's to 87 FR 77508 of 19 December 2022, and NAURA's and SiCarrier's to 89 FR 96836 of 5 December 2024. Hua Hong appears in none of those actions.^[13]

Nor is Hua Hong on the US Department of Defense list of Chinese military companies published under Section 1260H of the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act. The version published in the Federal Register on 10 June 2026 includes SMIC together with a list of named SMIC subsidiaries, and CXMT, but contains no Hua Hong, Huahong or Huali entry.^[14]

The April 2026 equipment letters

Hua Hong has nonetheless been the subject of a targeted US restriction, applied through company-specific letters rather than through a published list. Reuters reported in late April 2026 that the US Department of Commerce had ordered several chip equipment makers, including Lam Research, Applied Materials and KLA, to halt shipments of certain tools to Hua Hong. According to that report the restrictions covered Fab 6 in Shanghai, which runs 28/22nm, and a facility identified as Fab 8a said to be under construction, as well as Huali Micro, which had begun 7nm research with support from Huawei-backed SiCarrier. The stated concern was advanced logic capability usable for AI chips.^[16]

The targets are worth reading carefully. Fab 6 and Huali Micro are the advanced-logic part of the Huahong Group structure, and Huali Micro is the asset the listed company is in the middle of acquiring. Nothing in the reported scope touches the 200mm specialty fabs or the Wuxi power and analogue lines that generate the great majority of the listed company's revenue. In other words the action follows the leading-edge logic of every previous control: it is aimed at the part of the group trying to move toward advanced nodes, not at the mature-node business.

Section 301 and mature-node chips

The United States opened a Section 301 investigation on 23 December 2024 into "China's acts, policies, and practices related to targeting of the semiconductor industry for dominance", explicitly framed around Chinese mature-node or legacy chips reaching US critical industries through downstream products.^[15] The Chinese government declined the requested consultations. USTR held a hearing on 11 March 2025 and received 26 written comments.

The determination was published on 29 December 2025. The US Trade Representative found China's targeting of the sector unreasonable and burdensome to US commerce, citing more than 100 central and sub-central industrial plans over 25 years containing over 300 qualitative and 170 quantitative targets, and a publicly stated goal of capturing 56% of the international market and 80% of the domestic one. The responsive action was a tariff on semiconductors from China set at an initial rate of 0%, effective 23 December 2025, to be increased on 23 June 2027 at a rate to be announced at least 30 days in advance. These duties sit on top of the existing 50% Section 301 tariff on semiconductors from China from the earlier forced technology transfer investigation. The covered tariff lines include high-purity silicon, doped wafers, diodes, transistors, thyristors, photosensitive devices and integrated circuits.^[15]

That scope is a direct hit on Hua Hong's product mix in a way that AI chip controls are not. Discretes under heading 8541 and integrated circuits under 8542 are exactly what the company makes. The zero starting rate and 18-month runway mean the effect is prospective rather than immediate, and much of Hua Hong's output reaches the United States indirectly, inside finished goods, rather than as a direct import.

Europe and mature-node overcapacity

The European Union has treated mature-node dependence as an economic security question rather than a technology denial question. The US-EU Trade and Technology Council joint statement of 5 April 2024 recorded that both sides "share concerns about non-market economic policies and practices that may lead to distortionary effects or excessive dependencies for mature node ('legacy') semiconductors", noted a US industry survey launched in January 2024 and EU information gathering, and committed the two to consult on planned actions and possibly develop joint or cooperative measures.^[20]

An analysis published by the EU Institute for Security Studies in December 2024 set out the underlying arithmetic: China holds around 30% of the global legacy chip market against the EU's 13%, accounts for around 40% of globally planned legacy capacity expansion to 2030, and legacy chips will remain roughly three quarters of global semiconductor demand. It projected an EU supply gap of 12.7 million wafers per year by 2030 against 4.5 million wafers of announced European capacity, leaving at least 8.2 million wafers to be imported.^[21] That is the policy problem Hua Hong sits inside: not that China cannot make these chips, but that it can make a great many of them cheaply.

The counter-story to the AI chip narrative

Almost everything written about Chinese semiconductors concerns the leading edge: whether SMIC can yield 5nm without EUV, what Huawei can do with domestic tools, whether export controls are working. Hua Hong is the counterweight to that story in three ways.

First, mature-node capacity is where Chinese scale is real rather than aspirational. Hua Hong shipped 5.384 million 200mm-equivalent wafers in 2025 at above 100% utilisation, for customers buying on ordinary commercial terms.^[2] There is no technology gap to close in super junction MOSFETs or 0.18 micron BCD.

Second, the segment is commercially viable now. The 2024 trough was a pricing and margin problem, not a technology failure, and by mid-2026 the direction had reversed. TrendForce reported in June 2026 that average utilisation across the top ten foundries' 200mm fabs had recovered to 88% in 2026 and was expected to reach 90% in the second half, that foundry prices rose 5% to 15% between the first and second quarters of 2026, and that a third round of increases was being prepared. It also noted that as TSMC and Samsung reduce or repurpose mature-node capacity, customers are "increasingly turning to Chinese foundries as alternative manufacturing partners", driving order growth for China's mature-node ecosystem.^[19] AI is tightening this market from the demand side too, because AI servers consume large volumes of power management ICs and power discretes built on exactly these platforms.

Third, the policy anxiety runs the other way. On advanced logic, Western policy is designed to prevent China from catching up. On mature nodes, the USTR determination and the EU analysis are about oversupply, dependence and price, and the instruments are tariffs and dependency reduction rather than technology denial.^[15][20][21] Hua Hong is not a company the controls were built to slow down; it is a company the tariffs were built to price.

Limitations

Hua Hong's constraints are real and mostly structural.

It cannot move up. The listed company's most advanced processes are 40nm logic and embedded flash and 48nm NOR flash, and its path to anything more advanced runs through Huali Micro, which is precisely the asset the April 2026 US equipment letters targeted.^[16][22][26] Domestic tool suppliers such as NAURA, AMEC and SiCarrier can cover a growing share of mature-node process steps but do not close the lithography gap.

Profitability is thin. Gross margin was 11.8% in 2025 and 13.0% in the first quarter of 2026, against 34.1% in 2022.^[2][6] The company has been reporting a group-level net loss since 2024 while heavy depreciation from Fab 9 works through the income statement, and only stays profitable at the attributable line because state and municipal co-investors absorb the Wuxi losses.^[2]

It is exposed to consumer electronics. Consumer accounted for 63.8% of 2025 revenue, a segment with thin margins and short cycles, and TrendForce has flagged rising memory prices and component costs as a drag on consumer electronics shipments in the second half of 2026.^[2][17][19]

It depends on Chinese demand, at 82.2% of 2025 revenue, in a domestic market that also contains SMIC and Nexchip among the world's ten largest foundries by revenue.^[2][17][18]

And it carries policy risk on both sides. Its ultimate parent is Shanghai SASAC and the Big Fund sits in its subsidiaries, which makes it a natural target for exactly the state-support arguments the Section 301 determination is built on.^[2][15]

See also

• China's semiconductor industry
• SMIC
• CXMT
• YMTC
• NAURA
• AMEC
• SiCarrier
• Entity List
• AI chip export controls

References

1. ^Hua Hong Grace Semiconductor Limited, "Company Profile". huahonggrace.com/...about
2. ^Hua Hong Semiconductor Limited, "Annual Results Announcement for the Year Ended 31 December 2025" (containing the full text of the 2025 Annual Report), HKEXnews, 26 March 2026. www1.hkexnews.hk/...2026032602730.pdf
3. ^Hua Hong Grace Semiconductor Limited, "Company Milestones". huahonggrace.com/...about_milestone
4. ^Hua Hong Semiconductor Limited, "Our History and Development", Hong Kong listing document, HKEXnews, 2014. www1.hkexnews.hk/...ehua-20140926-16.pdf
5. ^Hua Hong Grace Semiconductor Limited, "Fabs". huahonggrace.com/...business_fab
6. ^Hua Hong Semiconductor Limited, "Reports 2026 First Quarter Results", HKEXnews, 14 May 2026. www1.hkexnews.hk/...2026051400506.pdf
7. ^Hua Hong Semiconductor Limited, "Reports 2025 Fourth Quarter Results", HKEXnews, 12 February 2026. www1.hkexnews.hk/...2026021200389.pdf
8. ^Hua Hong Grace Semiconductor Limited, "Change of Company Name and Stock Short Name", HKEXnews, 3 June 2026. www1.hkexnews.hk/...2026060302470.pdf
9. ^Hua Hong Semiconductor Limited, "(1) Major and Connected Transaction: Acquisition of Share Capital of the Target Involving the Issue of Consideration Shares; (2) Proposed Non-public Issuance of RMB Shares", HKEXnews, 31 August 2025. www1.hkexnews.hk/...2025083100319.pdf
10. ^Hua Hong Grace Semiconductor Limited, "Further Update on the Major and Connected Transaction Involving Acquisition of Share Capital in the Target", HKEXnews, 8 July 2026. www1.hkexnews.hk/...2026070801060.pdf
11. ^Hua Hong Semiconductor Limited, Annual Report 2022, HKEXnews, 11 April 2023. www1.hkexnews.hk/...2023041100149.pdf
12. ^Hua Hong Semiconductor Limited, Annual Report 2024, HKEXnews, 8 April 2025. www1.hkexnews.hk/...2025040800831.pdf
13. ^Entity List, Supplement No. 4 to 15 CFR Part 744, Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, full text of Part 744 as current on 30 July 2026. ecfr.gov/...title-15.xml
14. ^US Department of Defense, "Notice of Availability of Designation of Chinese Military Companies", 91 FR 35189, 10 June 2026. govinfo.gov/...2026-11571
15. ^Office of the United States Trade Representative, "Notice of Action: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Targeting of the Semiconductor Industry for Dominance", 90 FR 60848, 29 December 2025. govinfo.gov/...2025-23912
16. ^Reuters, "US halts orders to Chinese chip firm Hua Hong", republished by the Taipei Times, 30 April 2026. taipeitimes.com/...2003856470
17. ^TrendForce, "AI Demand Drives 4Q25 Global Top 10 Foundries Revenue Up 2.6% QoQ; Samsung Gains Share and Tower Moves Up in Rankings", 12 March 2026. trendforce.com/...20260312-12965
18. ^TrendForce, "Strong AI Demand and Early Consumer Electronics Inventory Build Drive Top 10 Foundries to 3.7% QoQ Revenue Growth in 1Q26", 12 June 2026. trendforce.com/...20260612-13095
19. ^TrendForce, "AI Component Capacity Squeeze and Foundry Output Cuts to Extend Mature-Node Price Increases in 2027", 30 June 2026. trendforce.com/...20260630-13127
20. ^Office of the United States Trade Representative, "U.S.-EU Joint Statement of the Trade and Technology Council", 5 April 2024. ustr.gov/...statement-trade-and-technology-council
21. ^Tim Rühlig, "Curbing China's legacy chip clout: Reevaluating EU strategy", European Union Institute for Security Studies, 13 December 2024. iss.europa.eu/...ip-clout-reevaluating-eu-strategy
22. ^Hua Hong Grace Semiconductor Limited, "Embedded Memory". huahonggrace.com/...business_embedded_storage
23. ^Hua Hong Grace Semiconductor Limited, "Power Discrete". huahonggrace.com/...business_power_component
24. ^Hua Hong Grace Semiconductor Limited, "Analog and Power Management". huahonggrace.com/...business_ap_management
25. ^Hua Hong Grace Semiconductor Limited, "Logic and RF". huahonggrace.com/...business_logic_rf
26. ^Hua Hong Grace Semiconductor Limited, "Standalone Memory". huahonggrace.com/...business_independent_storage
27. ^Hua Hong Grace Semiconductor Limited, "Notification of Board Meeting", HKEXnews, 30 July 2026. www1.hkexnews.hk/...2026073000368.pdf
28. ^"'909工程'和华虹集团" ("The '909 Project' and Huahong Group"), Sina Finance, 5 December 2024. finance.sina.com.cn/...doc-incymitn9634836.shtml